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Constitutional Law-PRACTICAL

SOLUTIONS TO AN ENDURING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT-Minneapoh's Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341

N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1983).
In November 1982, Craig Swanson was charged with criminal negligence after killing two high school girls in a hit and run accident.'
Before Swanson's trial, Sherburne County District Court Judge Daniel
Kammeyer called a pretrial hearing to consider suppressing potentially
prejudicial evidence of Swanson's previous DWI records. 2 In this highly
publicized 3 and emotionally charged case, Judge Kammeyer was not
convinced that Swanson could get a fair trial by an impartial jury if the
public became aware of this evidence. Judge Kammeyer therefore ruled
that Swanson's right to a fair trial would be jeopardized by a public
5
hearing4 and ordered the hearing closed to the public and press.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed Judge Kammeyer's action in
Minneapoh's Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer.6 The issues raised in Kammeyer7
1. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. 1983).
2. Id. at 552-53.
3. Id. at 552.
4. Id.,- cf.Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (lower court decision reversed
and remanded because trial court failed to protect accused from hostile publicity); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (telecast of hearing and trial negated defendant's chance for
fair trial); Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (conviction of defendant whose confession had been broadcast on television reversed); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (conviction vacated and new trial ordered because defendant had been exposed to hostile and
unrelenting publicity). But cf. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (convictions upheld
because pretrial publicity not sufficiently damaging to warrant vacating verdict). Seegenerally Powell, The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A. J. 534 (1965) (discussing balancing of
rights to free press and fair trial and proposing solutions).
5. 341 N.W.2d at 552.
6. Id. at 550.
7. The court specifically considered five overlapping issues, the combined effect of
which was the re-examination of Minnesota's position on fair trial and free press. Id. at
553-54. Those specific issues and the holdings for each were:
(1) The court considered whether the trial court had erred in refusing to provide the
public or representatives of the press with an opportunity to be heard prior to closing the
pretrial hearing. The court found that Judge Kammeyer under existing law had acted
reasonably and had properly taken into account the rights of all parties concerned. Id at
558.
(2) Because Judge Kammeyer had restricted attorneys' comments to the press, the
supreme court considered whether such a "gag" order was appropriate. The court decided the issue was moot because the trial court had rescinded the order before trial. Id
(3) The court considered whether the records of pretrial hearings were governed by
the substantial likelihood standard of Rule 25.01 or the clear and present danger standard
of Rule 25.03. The court held that Rule 25.01 governed both pretrial hearings and the
records of closed pretrial hearings. Id.," see infra notes 54-87 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rules 25.01 and 25.03.
(4) The court considered whether the trial court had exceeded the limits of discretion by closing the pretrial hearing and restricting access to part of the pretrial record.
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result from the recurring struggle to effectively balance the press and
public's8 first amendment right of access 9 with the defendant's sixth
The court held that the trial court had acted appropriately and within the bounds of the
law as it existed at that time. Id at 559.
(5) The court considered whether Rules 25.01 and 25.03 achieve a proper balance
between first and sixth amendment rights. The court concluded that existing law required
additional procedural safeguards to strike a proper balance. Id; see infa notes 54-87 and
accompanying text (reasons leading to the court's conclusion).
8. Hereinafter, "public" will refer to "press and public."
9. The first amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Article 1,
§ 3 of the Minnesota Constitution provides that "[tihe liberty of the press shall forever
remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Article 1, § 6 of the Minnesota Constitution similarly provides in relevant part that:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Because the sixth amendment is the only constitutional source stating that a criminal
defendant has a right to a "public trial," the right of public access has been attributed to
the sixth amendment. See United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 605-06
(3d Cir. 1969) (sixth amendment public trial requirement is applicable in state criminal
proceedings); cf. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 847 (3d Cir. 1978) (presumption
that all adjudicative proceedings are open to the public is rooted in the fifth and sixth
amendments); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1973) (open trials serve
as a restraint against the abuse ofjudicial power).
Some commentators have objected to this interpretation, maintaining that the sixth
amendment speaks only of the right of the defendant to a public trial. Schmidt & Schmidt,
Some Observations on the Swinging CourthouseDoors ofGannett and Richmond Newspapers, 59
DEN. L.J. 721, 729 (1982); Note, The Right to Attend CriminalHearings, 78. COLUM. L. REV.
1308 (1978) (defendants rely on right to trial by an impartial jury to exclude press and
public and to prevent widespread publication of their case). These commentators have
consequently derived a right of access on behalf of the public and press from the first
amendment. They reason that the first amendment guarantee of free expression and the
right to communicate openly through the press implies a correlative right to gather information. Although the first amendment does not specifically guarantee the media access to
criminal proceedings, this right has been determined to be a direct, although not absolute,
extension of the first amendment right of a free press. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980) (plurality opinion) (first and fourteenth amendments guarantee the right of public and press to attend criminal trials absent an overriding interest in defendant's right to a fair trial); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
400-01 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555-56 (3d
Cir. 1982).
The Criden court noted at least six societal interests supporting open court proceedings. First, public access increases the public's understanding of and participation in governmental affairs. Second, particularly in criminal trials, access promotes the perception
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amendment right to a fair trial.1O Confronted with this dilemma, the
supreme court emphasized first amendment concerns by holding that
pretrial hearings are presumed open.' The court then stressed sixth
amendment interests by allowing the exclusion of the public from a pretrial hearing if there is a substantial likelihood12 that the resulting publicity will interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.13 Finally, the Kammeyer court adopted a procedural
framework by which the rights of the public and the accused can be
evaluated and effectively balanced.14
The in camera hearing at issue in Kammeyer was called by Judge Kamthat the trial was fair to all parties. Third, open access to criminal trials provides a public
cartharsis by allowing the public to vent its anger and hostility. Fourth, open trials serve
as a check on judicial corruption by exposing the judicial procedure to the public. Fifth,
open access to criminal proceedings enhances the performance and effort of all parties
involved. Finally, open criminal trials discourage perjury. Id. at 556 (citing Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555).
10. See supra note 9 (text and discussion of sixth amendment). The free press-fair trial
issue is not new. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court stated
that although neither constitutional language nor contemporaneous writings indicate an
anticipated conflict of first and sixth amendment rights, the Founding Fathers must have
recognized a potential conflict. Id at 547. See generally Note, The Publics Right to Access
Versus the Right to a Fair Trial-.A Balancing Compromise, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 191 (1981)
(discussing factors courts may consider in balancing first and sixth amendment rights).
11. See 341 N.W.2d at 558-59.
12. This standard is derived from Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.01,
which provides:
All pretrial hearings shall be open to the public. However, the defendant may
move that all or part of such hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to
the public on the ground that dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at
the hearing may disclose matters that may be inadmissible in evidence at the
trial and likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The
motion shall not be grantedunless the court determines that there is a substantialhkelihood of
such interference. With the consent of the defendant, the court may make such an
exclusion order on its own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution. No
exclusion order shall issue without the court setting forth the reasons therefor.
Any person aggrieved may petition the supreme court for immediate review of
the order granting or denying exclusion. Whenever under this rule all or part of
any pretrial hearing is held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, a
complete record of the proceedings shall be made and upon request shall be
transcribed and filed and shall be available to the public following the completion of the trial or disposition of the case without trial. For the protection of
innocent persons, the court may order that names be deleted or substitutions
made therefor in the record.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.01 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
13. 341 N.W.2d at 557. Impartiality is not synonymous with ignorance of the case or
complete lack of exposure to pretrial publicity. Impartiality instead denotes the juror's
ability to set aside preconceptions and confront the facts of the case with an open mind.
See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799-800; Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (Court found actual prejudice
against defendant to a degree precluding any possibility of fair trial when jurors stated "it
would take evidence to overcome their belief in his guilt").
14. 341 N.W.2d at 559-60. For future cases involving first and sixth amendment conflicts, the Kammeyer court set out the following trial court guidelines:
1. All criminal trials held in Minnesota shall be deemed open to the public and
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meyer to hear the defendant's motions to suppress evidence and to
change venue, and "to cover some administrative matters."' 5 After the
hearing had begun, Judge Kammeyer declared the proceeding closed to
the public. 16 In response to the closure, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company filed a petition with the supreme court requesting a review
to the press, including pretrial conferences or hearings, except as limited by this
opinion.
2. If, prior to trial, counsel for either the prosecution or the defense has evidence that he believes may be the subject of an exclusionary order, he has a duty
first to advise opposing counsel of that fact and suggest that both counsel meet
privately with the presiding judge in chambers and disclose to the court the
problem. If counsel for either side refuses to meet with the court, the court may
order counsel to be present in chambers.
3. In chambers, the court shall review the evidence outlined to him by counsel
that might be the subject of a restrictive order. If the court feels that any of the
proffered evidence might properly be the subject for a restrictive order, the court
shall immediately docket a notice of hearing on a motion for a restrictive order
made by either counsel or move for such an order on its own motion. Such
notice shall be reasonably calculated to afford the public and the press with an
opportunity to be heard on whether the defendant is likely to be deprived of a
fair trial if the press and public are permitted to attend the pretrial hearing.
4. At the hearing held pursuant to such notice, the trial court shall advise all
present that evidence has been disclosed to it that may be the subject of a closure
order and shall give the public and the news media an opportunity to suggest
any alternatives to a restrictive order.
5. The court shall not order a pretrial hearing closed to the public unless it
finds that there would be a substantial likelihood of prejudice to defendant if the
public were allowed to attend. Such a closure order must be supported by findings of fact and must include a review of alternatives to closure and a statement
of why the court believes such alternatives are inadequate. Any matter to be
decided which does not present the risk of revealing inadmissible, prejudicial
information shall be decided openly and on the record.
6. All matters discussed in a closed hearing shall be the subject of a complete
record as provided in Rule 25.01.
7. Nothing in this opinion is intended to restrict bench or in-chambers conferences held during the trial of a criminal case provided that a complete record is
made of bench conferences and said record provided to the press and to the
public after completion of a trial in the same manner as a record is made available under Rule 25.01.
Id For a discussion of these guidelines, see inf/a
notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
15. 341 N.W.2d at 552; see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
Evidence of prior convictions may be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes if the prosecution furnishes the defendant with a written statement of offenses it
intends to present in court. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496-97, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173
(1965).
A change of venue had already been granted, but Kammeyer was also considering
where to relocate the trial and "other administrative matters" during this pretrial hearing.
341 N.W.2d at 552; see Amicus Brief for the Minnesota State Public Defender at 2, Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1983).
16. 341 N.W.2d at 552. Judge Kammeyer ordered the hearing closed pursuant to
Rule 25.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and under Gannett, 443 U.S.
368. See supra note 12 (text of rule); infta
notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussion of
Gannett). Judge Kammeyer then asked that one of petitioner's reporters waiting outside
the chamber be notified of the closure. The reporter was admitted briefly to the judge's
chambers to ask why the hearing was closed and to state on the record his attorney's
objection to closure. Id at 552. After the hearing, the reporter asked for a copy of the
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of the closure order and a writ of mandamus ordering the judge to provide the press with all closed records pertinent to the hearing.17 A few
days later, Judge Kammeyer filed two written orders. A closed orderl 8
delineated the evidence discussed during the pretrial hearing including
details of Swanson's DWI record. 19 The second, a public order, stated
that the suppression hearing had been closed to the public and set a date
for a public hearing to determine the status of the closed hearing
20
record.
The specific issue considered at the public hearing was whether public
access to the closed order was governed by the substantial likelihood of
prejudice standard of Rule 25.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, governing motions to exclude the public from pretrial hear2
ings, 1 or the clear and present danger of prejudice standard of Rule
25.03, governing orders restricting access to public records. 22 Judge
Kammeyer ruled that a portion 23 of the closed order was governed by
the substantial likelihood standard 24 and would remain closed until the
2
25
The rest of the closed order was made public.
trial had concluded.

6

The Minnesota Supreme Court used a common sense approach to resolve the first and sixth amendment conflict arising from Judge Kamorder closing the hearing. Judge Kammeyer refused to comply with the reporter's request.
Id at 553.
17. Id at 553. This petition was filed pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.01 allowing "any person aggrieved" to petition the supreme court "for immediate
review of the order granting or denying exclusion." MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.01; see supra
note 12 (text of Rule 25.01).
18. 341 N.W.2d at 553. This order was originally called the "pretrial order," but the
supreme court referred to it as the "closed order." Id.
19. Id. The closed order was given only to the parties' attorneys and to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Id.
20. Id The public order also directed the parties' attorneys to refrain from making
any public comments about the case during its pendency. Id The Kammeyer court instructed the parties to address the issue whether this restriction constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint, id at 554, but held that the matter was moot because the trial court
rescinded the order before trial. Id at 558.
21. Seesupra note 12 (text of rule); znfra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussion
of MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.01).
22. 341 N.W.2d at 553; see infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (text and discussion of MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.03).
23. Four paragraphs reciting the specifics of Swanson's previous DWI convictions and
of the plea negotiations related to those offenses remained confidential. 341 N.W.2d at
553.
24. The trial court also maintained that if the stricter standard of Rule 25.03 had
been applicable, the closed portion would, nonetheless, have qualified for closure. Id at
553.
25. Id When the record of those paragraphs was later opened to the public, Swanson's prior record made front page news. Black, Jury didn't know Swanson had three DWI
convictions, Minneapolis Star & Trib., July 13, 1983, at IA, col. 1.
26. 341 N.W.2d at 553.
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meyer's decisions.27 The Kammeyer court avoided the conflicting solutions
of other jurisdictions.28 It based its decision on the principles embodied
27. See general Goldberg, The First Amendment and Its rotections, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 5 (1980). Justice Goldberg lists a number of decisions where the courts have addressed the first amendment-sixth amendment conflict. Id. at 5-6. He concludes that the
sixth amendment is winning. Id. at 7-8. But see Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two
Rights Against The State, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 211 (1977). Associate Justice Hans A. Linde
of the Oregon Supreme Court disagrees that there is a conflict. He argues that these rights
run against the government, whereas citizens do not have constitutional rights against
each other. Id at 216-17.
28. Numerous courts have recognized a first amendment right of access to pretrial
hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1982) (first
amendment right of access to pretrial supression hearings); Criden, 675 F.2d at 557 (first
amendment right of access to suppression, due process and entrapment hearings); In re
United States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678-81 (8th Cir. 1980) (first
amendment right of access to voir dire examination proceedings); Cianfran, 573 F.2d at
846-51 (first amendment right of access to pretrial and suppresssion hearings); United
States v. Civella, 493 F. Supp. 786, 791 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (constitutional right of society to
public pretrial hearings); State v. Burak, 37 Conn. Supp. 627, 629-30, 431 A.2d 1246,
1247-48 (1981) (first amendment right of access to courtroom during pretrial presentation
by defendant of evidence of unprejudicial matters); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d
1321, 1343-46 (D.C. App. 1981) (first amendment right to attend pretrial detention hearings), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 578-79,
292 So. 2d 815, 819-21 (1982) (first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 53, 459 A.2d 641, 648 (1983) (first amendment
right of access to criminal pretrial proceedings); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419,
424-25, 414 A.2d 318, 321 (constitutional right of access to pretrial hearings), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 992 (1980); State ex rel Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 546, 552
(W. Va. 1980) (first amendment right of access where defendant fails to prove widespread
publicity would be prejudicial); cf Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wifvat, 328
N.W.2d 920, 925-30 (Iowa 1983) (sixth amendment includes public right of access to pretrial hearings). But see San Jose Mercury News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 506,
638 P.2d 655, 660, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 777 (1982) (no right of access to criminal trials
under the federal constitution); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 383 So. 2d 236,
238 (Fla: Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Gannett stands for proposition that media has no constitutional right of access to pretrial suppression hearings), rev'don other grounds, 426 So. 2d 1, 6
(Fla. 1982) (no first amendment protection of public's right to attend pretrial hearings); In
re Midland Publishing Co., Inc., 113 Mich. App. 55, 61-62, 317 N.W.2d 284, 287 (1982)
(following Gannett, there is no constitutional public right of access to criminal pretrial proceedings); Federal Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 58, 615 P.2d 440, 443-47
(1980) (state freedom of speech amendment does not provide for public access to pretrial
hearings).
Although a majority of courts recognize the constitutional right of access, the standards by which first and sixth amendment rights are balanced vary widely. Some courts
have adopted standards requiring only a minimal showing that prejudice to the defendant
will result from publicity. See, e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393 (reasonable probability of
prejudice); id at 401 (Powell, J., concurring) (likelihood of prejudice); Burak, 37 Conn.
Supp. at 630-31, 431 A.2d at 1248 (likelihood of prejudice); Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1345
(likelihood that pretrial publicity will jeopardize the defendant's fair trial); Hayes, 489 Pa.
at 427, 414 A.2d at 322 (closure allowed "where the interests of justice require").
Other jurisdictions have adopted more stringent standards. See, e.g., Lumpkin, 249 Ga.
at 580, 292 S.E.2d at 820 ("clear and convincing proof that no means available other than
closure . . . will serve to protect right of the movant"); HeraldMail Co., 267 S.E.2d at 552
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in three recent United States Supreme Court decisions 29 and the Minne30
sota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In considering whether the public had a first amendment right of access to pretrial hearings,31 the Kammeyer court began its analysis by reviewing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale.32 In Gannett, the respondants requested that the press and
public be excluded from a hearing on a motion to suppress confessions
and physical evidence.33 After a public hearing on the closure motion,
the trial court ruled that the reasonable probability of prejudice arising
from the potential publicity justified closure. 34 The Gannett Court upheld the trial court's ruling and declared that the public does not have a
35
right under the sixth amendment to attend criminal pretrial hearings.
The Court declined to consider whether the public had a first amendment right of access, ruling instead that any first amendment right that
existed had been protected by the trial court procedures followed before
ordering closure. 36 In short, Gannett favored sixth amendment rights,
leaving the fair trial-free press balance to be struck by the procedures of
individual courts.
(facts must demonstrate that the defendant would suffer irreparable damage to right to a
fair trial); Williams, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A.2d at 654 ("realistic likelihood of prejudice to a
fair trial" and inadequate alternatives); Federal Publications, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d at 64, 615
P.2d at 447 (pretrial closure may be "no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose").
The American Bar Association advocates the clear and present danger of prejudice
standard to govern closure of pretrial hearings. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§ 8-3.2

(APPROVED DRAFT

1980); see also Keene

Publishing Corp. v. Keene Dist. Court, 117 N.H. 959, 961-62, 380 A.2d 261, 263 (1977)
(advocating the ABA standard, but basing the right of public access on sixth amendment);
cf. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(would "require accused who seeks closure to establish that it is strictly and inescapably
necessary"); Cianfram, 573 F.2d at 858 ("strictly and inescapably necessary" standard);
Civela, 493 F. Supp. at 789 (substantial probability of irreparable damage resulting from
publicity); Miami Herald,383 So. 2d at 238-39 (closure allowed only if necessary to prevent
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice and less restrictive alternatives are unavailable); Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 328 N.W.2d at 925 (irreparable
damage).
29. 341 N.W.2d at 554-58. The Kammeyer court relied on Gannett, 443 U.S. 368, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982). 341 N.W.2d at 554-58.
30. Id at 558-59. The Kammeyer court examined the standards and procedures found
in Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 25.01 and 25.03. See supra note 12 for text of
Rule 25.01; infra
note 61 for text of Rule 25.03.
31. Id at 554, 557-58.
32. 443 U.S. 368.
33. Id.at 375.
34. Id
35. Id at 394.
36. Id at 392.
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Although Gannett avoided the first amendment issue, 37 subsequent
United States Supreme Court decisions relied upon in Kammeyer38 suggest a two-factor test be used in balancing first amendment access rights
with the competing right to a fair trial. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virgi1n'a,39 the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment provides
the press and public a right of access to criminal trials.40 Justice Brennan, concurring with the majority, stated that the right of public access
to a legal proceeding is based on a longstanding tradition with its roots in
the English common law.41 Justice Brennan also stated that public access to a particular government process becomes crucial when public
awareness serves the goals of that particular process. 42
This two-factor analysis, historical practice and the positive effect of
public access on the government process, was approved by the United
States Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.43 In Globe,
the Court reversed a trial court order excluding the public from the trial
of a man charged with raping three minor girls.44 The Court reasoned
that public access to criminal trials had an enduring historical basis and
permitted the public to participate in and serve as a check on the polit45
ical process.
Based on these Supreme Court cases, the Kammeyer court concluded
that there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial hearings in
37. Id.; see also 341 N.W.2d at 554-56.
38. 341 N.W.2d at 554-56; see Globe, 457 U.S. 596; RichmondNewspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
39. 448 U.S. 555. See generally Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: 4 New
But Uncertain "Right Of Access," 32 SYRACUSE L. REv. 989 (1981) (discussing RIchmond
decision and public right of access to criminal trial proceedings).
40. 448 U.S. at 580.
41. 448 U.S. at 589-93 (Brennan, J., concurring). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger traced the history of criminal trials. Id at 564-69. He began with a discussion
of pre-Norman courts, where attendance at trial was required, and followed the trial
through the history of English common law. "[A]though great changes in courts and
procedure took place [during that period], one thing remained constant: the public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was decided." Id at 556. Chief Justice
Burger then traced the trial into the judicial systems of colonial America, finding that
most colonies had some law assuring the openness of criminal trials. He concluded by
stating "the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open." Id at 569.
42. Id at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Richmond the Court recognized five societal interests served by an open criminal proceeding: (1) promotion of informed discussion
of governmental affairs, id at 572; (2) public awareness that criminal proceedings are fair,
id at 569-70; (3) "an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion," id at 571;
(4) enhancement of performance by those involved in the proceeding, id at 569 n.7; and
(5) discouragement of perjury, id at 569. See also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383; Karmeyer, 341
N.W.2d at 555.
43. 457 U.S. 596. Six of the Supreme Court justices used Justice Brennan's two criteria from Richmond Id at 605-06, 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id.at 611.
45. Id.at 601, 604.
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criminal cases. 46 The court applied the two-factor test espoused in Richmond and Globe to reach this conclusion. 47 The court reasoned that the
historical lack of public access to pretrial hearings48 should not impair
the first amendment rights of the press and public. 49 Pretrial proceedings are often decisive in criminal cases. 50 The public should not be pe-

nalized because pretrial proceedings are a relatively new criminal
procedure and have not developed a tradition of access. 51 The court
concluded that public access to pretrial hearings promotes the ends of the
governmental process. 52 Public awareness of pretrial hearings, stated the
court, "promotes fairness, accuracy, and public confidence in criminal

proceedings."

53

In addition to recognizing a right of access derived from the Richmond
and Globe analysis, the Kammejer court acknowledged the Gannett Court's
46. 341 N.W.2d at 555-56.
47. Id
48. The Court stated in Gannett that "there exists no persuasive evidence that" a right
of public access to pretrial proceedings existed at common law. 443 U.S. at 387; see also
Criden, 675 F.2d at 555. But see Fenner & Koley, Access toJudictalProceedings. To Richmond
Newspapers and Beyond 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 434 (1981) (public access to
pretrial judicial hearings has historical basis).
49. 341 N.W.2d at 556.
50. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 434-35, 435 n.14 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
[T]he suppression hearing resembles and relates to the full trial in almost every
particular. Evidence is presented by means of live testimony, witnesses are
sworn, and those witnesses are subject to cross-examination. Determination of
the ultimate issue depends in most cases upon the trier of fact's evaluation of the
evidence, and credibility is often crucial. Each side has incentive to prevail, with
the result that the role of publicity as a testimonial safeguard, as a mechanism to
encourage the parties, the witnesses, and the court to a strict conscientiousness in
the performance of their duties, and in providing a means whereby unknown
witnesses may become known, is just as important for the suppression hearing as
it is for the full trial.
Moreover, the pretrial supression hearing often is critical, and it may be
decisive, in the prosecution of a criminal case. If the defendant prevails, he will
have dealt the prosecution's case a serious, perhaps fatal, blow; the proceeding
often then will be dismissed or negotiated on terms favorable to the defense. If
the prosecution successfully resists the motion to suppress, the defendant may
have little hope of success at trial (especially where a confession is in issue), with
the result that the likelihood of a guilty plea is substantially increased.
Id at 434-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. 341 N.W.2d at 555; see also Criden, 675 F.2d at 555-56 (first amendment rights
upheld despite lack of tradition of open pretrial hearings).
52. 341 N.W.2d at 556. The public policy concerns articulated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court echo those set forth in Richmond as reasons for assuring access to criminal
trials. See 448 U.S. at 569. Access promotes public confidence in the legal process and
inhibits any tendency toward favoritism. Publicity of criminal trials discourages perjury.
It lends an air of fairness to the proceedings and educates citizens regarding the legal
process. 341 N.W.2d at 556; see also Fenner & Koley, supra note 48, at 428-30.
53. 341 N.W.2d at 556. The court noted, however, that potentially prejudicial publicity at the pretrail stage is generally more damaging to the defendant's right to a fair
trial than at the trial stage. Id. (citing Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581).
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endorsement of procedural remedies to alleviate conflicts between the
rights of fair trial and free press. 54 The Kammeyer court noted that procedural safeguards may be imposed on the first amendment right of access
to protect the defendant's sixth amendment interests. 55 Following the
Supreme Court's recommendation in Gannett, the Kammeyer court addressed the issue whether existing Minnesota court procedure properly
balanced the competing interests of fair trial and free press in the pretrial
setting.56
Rules 25.01 and 25.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
codify the two standards and procedures considered by the Kammeer
court to balance these interests.5 7 Rule 25.01 deems pretrial hearings
open to the public unless there is a substantial likelihood that evidence
discussed during the hearing may be inadmissable at trial and is likely to
interfere with the accused's right to a fair trial if disclosed to the public. 58
Under Rule 25.01, the trial court must state its reasons for closure if the
motion to close is granted. 59 A complete transcript of the closed hearing
must be made and disclosed to the public at the trial's completion.60
Rule 25.03 governs court orders restricting access to public records
pertaining to criminal proceedings. 6 1 According to Rule 25.03, courts
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at 557-58.
Id at 556.
Id at 558-59.
Seesupra note 12 (text of MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.01); infra note 61 (text of MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 25.03).
58. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.01; see also 341 N.W.2d at 556.

59.

MINN.

R.

CRIM.

P. 25.01.

60. Id
61. Rule 25.03 provides:
Restrictive Orders
Except as provided in Rule 33.04 the following rule shall govern the issuance of
any court order restricting public access to public records relating to a criminal
proceeding:
Subd. 1. Motion and Notice.
(a) A restrictive order may be issued only upon motion and after notice and
hearing.
(b) Notice of the hearing shall be given in the time and manner and to such
interested persons, including the news media, as the court may direct.
Subd. 2. Hearing.
(a) At the hearing, the moving party shall have the burden of establishing a
factual basis for the issuance of the order under the conditions specified in subd.
3.
(b) The public and news media shall have a right to be represented at the
hearing and to present evidence and arguments in support of or in opposition to
the motion.
(c) A verbatim record shall be made of the hearing.
Subd. 3. Grounds for Restrictive Order.
The court may issue a restrictive order under this rule only if the court concludes
on the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing that:
(a) Access to such public records will present a clear and present danger of
substantially interfering with the fair and impartial administration of justice.
(b) All alternatives to the restrictive order are inadequate.
Subd. 4. Findings of Fact.
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may restrict access if there exists a "clear and present danger of substan' '62
tially interfering with the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Before closure can be granted under Rule 25.03, a hearing must be held
to allow the public to present alternatives to closure. 63 The court may
bar access to the records only after concluding that a clear and present
6
danger exists and that all alternatives to closure are inadequate. 4
After examining these two rules, the Kammeyer court concluded that
the substantial likelihood test of Rule 25.01 was the appropriate standard. 65 Drawing support from the "reasonable probability of prejudice"
standard approved in Gannett,66 the Kammeyer court ruled that the test of
Rule 25.01 was constitutionally sufficient. 67 The Kammqer court also
based its decision on a determination that the only first amendment interest at stake was "the incremental value of immediate access to the information revealed at the hearing."68 Since Rule 25.01 grants access to the
complete transcript of the closed hearing at the trial's completion,69 the
public loses only the element of immediacy. 70 A closed hearing simply
defers public access until after the potential danger to the defendant has
passed. 7 1 The benefits of public access, 72 therefore, can be preserved
The court shall make written findings of the facts and statement of the reasons
supporting the conclusions upon which an order granting or denying the motion
is based.
Subd. 5. Appellate Review.
(a) Anyone represented at the hearing or aggrieved by an order granting or
denying a restrictive order may petition the supreme court for review, which
shall be the exclusive method for obtaining review.
(b) The supreme court shall determine upon the hearing record whether the
moving party sustained the burden of justifying the restrictive order under the
conditions specified in subd. 3 of this rule, and may reverse, affirm, or modify the
order issued.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.03.
62. Id at subd. 3(a).
63. Id at subds. 1-2.
64. Id at subd. 3.
65. 341 N.W.2d at 556-57.
66. Id; see supra notes 32-36 (discussion of Gannets.
67. 341 N.W.2d at 557. Minnesota's standard is now higher than the standard required by the United States Constitution since the Kammeyer court established a substantial likelihood test, rather than a mere reasonable probability requirement.
68. Id at 556. Contra infta note 71 (discussion of authorities disagreeing with this
proposition).
69. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 25.01; see supra note 12 for text of rule.
70. 341 N.W.2d at 556.
71. Some authorities have criticized this position, contending that the time lag in
releasing pretrial records mitigates the benefits that public access is meant to provide. "It
is vital to the operation of democratic government that citizens have facts and ideas on
important issues before them. A delay of even a day or two may be of crucial importance
in some instances." Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 442 n. 17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 560-61; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
268-69 (1941); Schmidt & Schmidt, supra note 9, at 756.
The Kammeyer court also noted that some of the value of immediate access is lost when
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even though the records are not released until after trial. In contrast, the
opportunity for a fair trial, once lost through prejudicial publicity, might
73
never be recovered.
The court acknowledged, however, that the accumulated procedures
of Rule 25.01 were insufficient to protect the first amendment right of
access to pretrial hearings. 74 Rule 25.01 failed to adequately protect the
right of access because it did not provide the public with an opportunity
to be heard before closure was ordered. 75 The Kammeyer court, therefore,
promulgated procedural guidelines similar to those provided in Rule
25.03, instituting public hearings before closure of pretrial hearings can
76
be granted.
These guidelines place a duty upon the defense to notify the prosecution that evidence may be subject to exclusion. Defense counsel must
then propose an in-chambers meeting with the presiding judge at which
the judge and attorneys for each party will review the relevant evidence. 77 If the judge decides that evidence may indeed be subject to a
restrictive order, he must provide the public with notice and a hearing to
consider the closure motion. 78 The purpose of this preclosure hearing is
to determine whether the defendant would be deprived of a fair trial if
records are withheld until a case has been disposed of. The court implied that this loss

may be minimal. 341 N.W.2d at 556.
72. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of public access).
73. "[R]eversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will
prevent the prejudice at its inception." Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
Some authorities claim that the effects of pretrial publicity and of efforts to mitigate
its impact are highly speculative. See Nebraska 1.ess, 427 U.S. at 563 (the effect of pretrial
publicity is of necessity speculative because it deals with "factors unknown and unknowable"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-11, at 631 (1978); cf. Thompson
v. McManus, 377 F. Supp. 589, 595 (D. Minn. 1974) (increased publicity is not decisive;
test is whether prospective jurors were exposed to adverse publicity and whether they are
unable to set aside preconceived opinions); Kline & Jess, PrjudicialPubicio."Its Eect on
Law School Mock Juries,43 JOURNALISM 113 (1966); Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact onJurors of News Coverage., 29
STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977) (experiments show that juries put aside extraneous information
and base their decisions on the evidence). But f. Padawer-Singer & Barten, The Impact of
PretrialPublicity on Juror's Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 125, 126 (R. Simon
ed. 1975) (trial publicity results in added costs in time and money because it causes protracted jury selection, motions and mistrials on the publicity issue, and added congestion
of court calendars).
74. 341 N.W.2d at 557.
75. Id
76. Id at 559-60; see supra note 14 (text of guidelines).
77. 341 N.W.2d at 559.
78. Id Either defense counsel or the court may move to close a suppression hearing.
Id
Rescinding a first amendment right requires that the aggrieved party receive due
process. See Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (ex
parte restraint order violated first amendment rights); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965) (heavy presumption against prior restraints on expression; specific requirements
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the hearing were open to the public. 79
During the preclosure hearing, the judge must explain that the evidence revealed to the court might be subject to a closure order.80 The
press and public may then suggest any alternatives,81 short of closure,
that would continue to protect the sixth amendment rights of the defendant.8 2 After considering these alternatives, the court may order the pretrial hearing closed if there is a substantial likelihood that the
defendant's right to a fair trial would be jeopardized by public disclosure
3
of evidence to be discussed during the hearing.8
A second procedural requirement established by the Kammeyer court
relates to the records of closed pretrial hearings. The court held that the
clear and present danger standard of Rule 25.03, which normally governs records of criminal proceedings, does not apply to records of closed
pretrial suppression hearings.84 In considering the constitutional interests at stake, the court ruled that the substantial likelihood standard of
Rule 25.01 most adequately balances the first and sixth amendment concerns.85 The court reasoned that the clear and present danger standard
would result in greater access to records of closed pretrial hearings. 8 6 Increased access and publicity defeats the purpose of closing the pretrial
hearing in the first place. To properly close a pretrial hearing under the
substantial likelihood standard, and then to allow immediate access to
must be met before speech can be restrained); L. TRIBE, supra note 73, §§ 12-31 to 12-33
(1978); Monaghan, First Amendment "'DueProcess," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 532 (1970).
Consequently, other jurisdictions also require notice to the press and public and a
hearing before pretrial closure. See, e.g., Criden, 675 F.2d at 550; Lewis, 426 So. 2d 236;
Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815; State ex rel.
New Mexico Press Ass'n v. Kaufman, 98
N.M. 261, 648 P.2d 300 (1982); W'lliams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641; cf.Iowa Freedom of
Information Counci, 328 N.W.2d 920 (notice optional).
79. 341 N.W.2d at 559.
80. Id.
81. Suggested alternatives include (1) sequestration, see State v. Morgan, 310 Minn.
88, 246 N.W.2d 165, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 936 (1976); Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318;
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 5(1); (2) sequestration of jurors on voir dire, see MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 26.02, subd. 4(2); (3) screening out prospective jurors affected by pretrial publicity, see Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563; (4) admonitions to jurors, see State v. Johnson, 307
Minn. 501, 239 N.W.2d 239 (1976); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 145, 373 A.2d 377, 383
(1977); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 8; (5) continuance, see Morgan, 310 Minn. 88, 246
N.W.2d 165; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 12.07; (6) change of venue, see Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at
564; Allen, 73 N.J. at 145, 373 A.2d at 383; and (7) voluntary media cooperation, Kammeyer,
341 N.W.2d at 553.
82. 341 N.W.2d at 559.
83. Id The opinion further requires that a closure order set forth the facts upon
which the closure decision is based and explain why proposed alternatives are "inadequate." Id The opinion states that bench conferences and in-chambers conferences during trial may be closed at the judge's discretion provided that a record of such proceedings
is made available to the public at the conclusion of the trial. Id.at 560.
84. See id at 558-59.
85. Id at 558, 560.
86. Id at 558-59.
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the record of the hearing under the clear and present danger standard,
would be self-defeating.87
The KammePer decision responds to the constitutional conflict between
the first and sixth amendments with clarity and common sense. In addition to establishing the first amendment right of access to pretrial hearings, the Kammeyer court developed moderate and practical procedural
guidelines for achieving a first amendment-sixth amendment balance.
The key new element in this procedure is the public opportunity to be
heard before pretrial hearings can be ordered closed. Minneapoh's Star &
Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer represents a step forward for Minnesota criminal
procedure. The concrete procedural developments that stem from it provide Minnesota's bench and bar with the means to effectively balance
the competing concerns of fair trial and free press.
87. See id
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